Marco Pelliccia
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Research

Working Papers

Incentive Design on Networks (with A. Daripa and S. Kapur)
We design a mechanism for network formation with privately known productivities that implements the socially optimal network through transfers based on opportunity costs, ensuring ex post incentive compatibility, pairwise stability, and budget balance.
[SSRN]


Network Structures and Credit Rating (with A. Daripa and S. Kapur)
We study whether productivity-consistent credit ratings can be inferred from endogenous network structure, showing that under suitable link costs equilibrium networks separate types and sustain ratings aligned with productivity.
[SSRN]


Published Papers

Decentralized Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure, Defence and Peace Economics, 2020.
I analyse how agents in a directed network allocate defence resources under external threats, showing that decentralised choices can be efficient with a strategic attacker but generally diverge from the social optimum under random attacks.


Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security (with V. Bove and L. Elia), Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2016.
We show that a country’s position in global trade networks—measured by network centrality—systematically shapes and constrains its military spending decisions.

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